Cold Shower
The recent storm over the Polish Armed Forces requires a sober commentary. The current discussion is focusing on the equipment, or rather its lack, of troops sent to Afghanistan and on the conflict on the line general – minister. However, the true problem has its roots much deeper. Identification of the real troubles of Polish Army is the key to its proper modernisation, which at this point is in the phase of infancy.
History Lesson
After the end of cold war the Republic of Poland had inherited Warsaw Pact style behemoth Armed forces equipped with partly obsolete Russian made equipment. The geopolitical change and new tasks and obligations that followed forced the reduction and restructuring of the army. In 1990’s Poland main goal was to seek the membership in NATO to reassure its security position in Europe. The lack of money and tense political situation did not help but also did not stop Poland from joining the Alliance in April 1999. I still remember that day as a soldier of 1st Motorised Infantry Brigade in Warsaw. I also recall the disappointment when my brothers in arms, and I realised that this is only a symbolic change for now and for the quality one we would have to wait way longer than our one year compulsory service term. No doubt ten years forward the very same young man would have encountered a different army – better equipped and trained, maintaining approximately 3,500 troops on foreign missions but still not the forces of the 21st century.
Quality vs. Quantity
The serious debate about professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) has begun in 2006 when the government took a series of steps leading to the liquidation of draft this year. Despite many propositions and models discussed by experts, politicians and soldiers, it is rather clear that whichever government in power, it will opt for smaller but better equipped and trained forces. To support this claim one can bring the obvious argument of money. PAF is funded by 1.95% of the GDP, which comes to the modest $11bn given the 2008 estimate. If compared with the UK or France not to mention USA spending on defence this amount is simply not enough to step up to politicians’ dreams of the Grande Armee of the 21st century.
The second obstacle in a prompt modernisation is the force structure. According to the Ministry of Defence today PAF is approximately 93,280 soldiers among whom 112 are generals, 22,200 officers, 42,050 non-commissioned officers, 16,530 privates, 10,000 contracted soldiers and some 2,500 cadets and trainees. The above numbers lead to the obvious conclusion that there is to many chiefs and not enough Indians in the Polish army. The administration and command structure also leaves a spacious room for improvement if not a radical change. Jan Nowak–Jezioranski has accurately pointed out that military bureaucracy, as any other bureaucracy on the world, easily falls into routine and indolence. The prevailing bureaucratism and old habits ought to be eradicated in PAF once for all.
Civilian Control
The (soon: former) Commander of Land Forces, general Skrzypczak being in the spotlight since his interview, has highlighted the main malaises of the army from the soldier’s point of view. He listed profligacy and lack of accuracy in procurement processes as well as lack of competence among civilian bureaucrats as the main culprits of the current situation. The civilian control of the armed forces is guaranteed by the Polish Constitution. However, it is reasonable to expect that the standard of this control as well as management will match the requirements of the armed forces. In the democratic ballroom, both the government and the army have to start dancing together.
It is a sad fact that the troops are still under equipped. Some of the basic gear, including uniforms, helmets, rifles, rucksacks and even underwear still remember communism times, which fact not only decreases the military capabilities of many units but most of all has a detrimental effect on morale. The government should be aware that the elite and professional army wants to look like one. Then there is a question of the soldiers’ personal security. It is inevitable that soldiers in the high risk theatres of operation such as Afghanistan will die and receive wounds. However, it is the government political, constitutional and moral responsibility to provide troops on the ground with the best equipment available to prevent fatalities. The best does not mean the most expensive.
Mission Impossible
The main task of PAF drawn in the Article 26 of the Constitution is to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the State, as well as to ensure the security and inviolability of its borders. This is why sending troops to the outlandish realms such as Chad often seems to confuse the public. Hence, another strong point that needs to be overrun is the clarification of the strategic mission of the Armed Forces. Both politicians and generals need to agree, whether to design an army capable of preventing the potential invasion of the mainland Poland or to create light, mobile and high-tech forces able to support NATO, EU and other allies in the future low intensity conflicts, wars on terror and other foreign endeavours. Financial prognosis for the future simply will not allow pursuing both objectives.
On the other hand, in the face of the dynamically evolving warfare it ought not to be forgotten, that the military presence abroad and missions, even if controversial and expensive, are necessary to groom the commanders and soldiers with field experience and expertise. No doubt this indispensable capital of knowledge will bring revenues in future. The modern and costly equipment is not enough to produce 21st century military, you need extraordinary leaders and specialists to lead it into a battle.
No-brainer
The military and defence thought in Poland is developed and studied mostly in the Army Colleges and the Academy of National Defence. Given the civilian involvement in the strategic planning and the equipment procurement for the army there is a need to set up at least two competitive, politically independent think-tanks, which will produce expertise and research available for politicians and the public. The existence of such institutions would raise awareness about defence issues in the society as well as lead to the more decent and levelled public debate. The humiliating and unprofessional recent debacle between Defence Minister and the Commander of The Land Forces could have been avoided, if the independent defence watchdogs would have existed on Polish soil.
Time to wake up
There is only one conclusion. The PAF need to modernise, and they need to do it with civilian oversight. The army should be the first organisation that the government has reformed to set an example of a job well done. This will not be possible without planning, money, civilised debate, and efficient execution.